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GLOBALISATION; NEITHER IDEOLOGY NOR UTOPIA

Meghnad Desai (1)

Introduction

The debate on globalisation has been raging now for some ten years. Starting from a celebratory account of a borderless world [Ohmae (1990)], scepticism about the extent and the novelty of globalisation [Hirst and Thompson (1995; 1999)], fear and loathing about its destructive consequences [Sassen (1998), Burbach (1997)] the debate has continued. This is a debate which excites sharp differences in books written by developed country authors [see for a contrast Friedman (1999), Grieder (1997), Barnes (1999) all writing from a US perspective] as much as writings by developing country authors [Amin (1997)]. The State has been pronounced as powerless in the face of globalisation [Ohmae (1990)] and in turn the powerless State has been denounced as a myth [Weiss (1998)]. Many fear that globalisation has brought about the rule by global corporations who are bound by no law except that of money making [Korten (1995)], that the new order is creating a 'global apartheid' [Alexander (1996)].

The position taken in this paper avoids any of the extremes of hope or fear. Globalisation is a phase of capitalism, but not so much a new phenomenon as a revival or resumption of a similar phase in the late 19th Century. As such, it is in its early stages of development. Capitalism in its global phase is taken to be a disequilibrium dynamic system which reproduces itself through cycles and crises. This is what I have elsewhere labelled a classical or a nineteenth century Marxist view [Desai, (forthcoming), (2000)]. Thus it is neither a utopia [Friedman (199) or Ohmae (1990)] nor a dystopia [Burbach (1997), Barnes (1999)]. In order to understand globalisation as a phase of Capitalism, it is necessary to revive certain ideas from classical political economy. The main idea is that of the economy is an organism which is the result of human action but not of human design. Adam Smith and Karl Marx share such a view which was doggedly held and propounded during the twentieth century by Hayek [For a comparison of Marx and Hayek, see Desai (1997) and Sciabarra (1995)].

The organicist view is contrasted with a mechanistic view which I argue prevailed through much of the twentieth century thinking. This view considers the economy (or society) as a result of a deliberate if faulty design and holds certain agents - capitalists/corporations, government/politicians, bankers/jews - as responsible for the design and operation of the machine that is the economy. Thus in this view, globalisation could be a creation of Western powers or global/transnational/multinational corporations. Their ideology would be the hegemonic ideology. It would then be programmatic to regulate/overcome/abolish such malevolent agents and establish a world government or New New Deal etc.

The view taken here is that globalisation is neither a utopia nor is it merely or creation of ideology. Ideas, especially the revival of the nineteenth century organicist ideas play a crucial role in our understanding of globalisation. But even then organicism has to be distinguished from neo-liberal or conservative ideology which is often as mechanistic as its socialist twin.

In order to lay down some markers, I list the characteristics of globalisation and its consequences in Box 1. This is done for reasons of brevity but the lists are as ecumenical as is possible in such a subject. After that, the history of capitalism over the years 1870-1970 is succinctly described. [A more detailed version is available in a book length manuscript which will see publication in the near future Desai (forthcoming).] This history is central to the question as to whether globalisation is a mere ideological epi-phenomenon or something more substantial. The history then leads to an articulation of the period 1970-1990 which is crucial to the break-up of the phase of 'capitalism in one country' that ruled in the short twentieth century 1914-1989. It also allows us to contrast the two philosophical views - organiscist and mechanist - in a simple form in Table 1.

Following this somewhat lengthy introduction, there follows an analysis of the contemporary phase of globalisation. Three questions are posed and answered - why has globalisation happened and happened now, whether it is a benevolent or a malevolent process and if there are any predictable limits to the process that globalisation represents. A historically specific but analytically coherent account is presented in the brad tradition of Classical (as against Leninist) Marxian political economy. The essay concludes by bringing together the main elements of the essay.


BOX 1

CHARACTERISTICS OF GLOBALISATION

cuban cigars online (a) deregulated capital markets with the possibility of speedy transfer of capital;

(b) communications and information technology which makes possible ìaction at a distance in real timeî which can be very short

(c) active forex markets with supporting financial markets with new products [e.g. derivatives, options] which allows speculators to take positions in any currency around the world where there are potential profit opportunities;

(d) greater geographical spread and increased mobility of fixed, i.e. direct, investment;

(e) rapid and linked reactions as between different financial markets which work round the world round the clock, as well as between financial markets and forex markets;

(f) the emergence of a global media network linked with a global communications network;

(g) the fashioning a of a global consumer culture and a global music/film/TV culture benefiting from all the above, especially [b] and [f];

(h) increased but as yet imperfect and legally impeded mobility of labour;

(i) greater awareness, though, as yet, not very effective redress of human rights violations, ecological disasters, famines and refugee problems, benefiting from [b] and [f];

(j) speeding up of technological change leading to increased concentration of capital via mergers and takeovers but at the same time increased competition between the surviving large companies.

CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALISATION

(l) reduced control of the nation state over its macro economic affairs especially in the matter of budgetary policy and monetary policy;

(2) increased volatility of forex and financial markets;

(3) displacement of manufacturing industry from its old locations in the North to selected locations - Asia, Latin America - in the South;

(4) a dematerialisation of the industrial products [the weightless economy];

(5) a feeling of increased job insecurity in the North as well as the South;

(6) increasing feminisation of the labour force;

(7) rapid spread of new technology embodied in new investment in the favoured locations of foreign direct investment;

(8) rapid industrialisation, despite some recent setbacks, of Asian economies;

(9) increased marginalisation of economies previously reliant on intergovernmental aid who are unable to attract capital, especially in Sub Saharan Africa.

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