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We need a vision of
the future of the EU that stresses Europe's wider role in a world
that is being transformed by globalisation; places an emphasis upon
pluralism and the decentralisation of power; responds to the demands
of the new economy; and sits comfortably with the need to find a
renewed role for the nation in the global age. I
don't think a federalist model fits any of these requirements particularly
well.
Fischer says 'we are
at the start of the age of globalisation', and this is something
I agree with. But he doesn't follow through this thought properly.
The new global era isn't just an extension of the past. It is in
many respects a break with it - nowhere more obviously so than
in the case of the dissolution of Soviet communism and the ending
of the Cold War period. The EU was strongly shaped by the Cold
War - it was constructed in a Western Europe that was a buffer zone
between the US and USSR. The fact that the
the EU can or has to
'expand towards the East', is not just a contingency of history,
as Fischer makes it appear. The events of 1989 both reflected globalisation
and contributed to its further advance. The issue of enlargement
hence has to be seen in the context of these transformations, which
mean that the EU today faces a very different world from that in
which it was originally shaped.
cuban cigars online What matters about
the European Union today is not primarily that it is European, but
that it forms a bridgehead towards global governance. If we think
of the EU as spanning a territory worth calling 'Europe', or as
representing some distinctive 'European past', we face intractable
difficulties. There is no 'natural' border of Europe to the East.
It is a positive step to propose that Turkey, as a 'non-European',
Islamic nation, should be a serious medium-term contender for membership.
In the longer-term the involvement of Russia should also be considered.
Fischer says that we
have 'put into place the last building block' of economic integration
of the EU, and now we should do the same politically. But this
isn't a valid way of looking at things. The troubles of the Euro
indicate, among other things, that there has been too little structural
reform in the core European economies. The way to defend the 'European
social model' is not through encouraging developments which will
protect existing welfare institutions, capital and labour markets.
We need a reformed European social model today, of the sort signalled
in the Lisbon declaration - one geared again to the demands of globalisation.
Countries like the UK, Denmark, Holland and Spain are showing the
way forward here, rather than France and Germany.
France and Germany
were the dominant countries driving the EU project during its Cold
War days. Against the background in which the EU was established
this was understandable, as was the need to 'contain' Germany.
However, in the contemporary world these factors have lost most
of their relevance. The chance of war between nations in Europe
are virtually non-existent, and the same can be said for nations
in many other parts of the world too.
The threat of 'old
wars' is diminishing massively. It is the 'new wars' that are going
to dominate the future. They will often be extremely difficult
to prevent or manage, as Europe has found to its cost in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Kosovo. The new wars, however, concern fragmenting nations,
not nations whose power is too strong. 'Containing Germany' is
no longer an issue. The Franco-German relationship, important although
it is because of the size of the two countries, no longer needs
to have a privileged position.
To the question 'what
is the EU?', if it is neither merely a marketplace or a stage on
the way to federalism, I would say the following. The EU (today)
is above all an experiment in transnational governance, of great
consequence to the rest of the world, not just to Europe itself,
and capable of being emulated elsewhere. Given the diversity of
nations and cultures involved, the EU is inherently diverse, and
its institutions must reflect that.
This position suggests
a fairly clear architecture for the future development of the Union.
The European Council should have a core directive role, something
that is happening anyway. A strong Commission and Parliament are
needed to provide stabilising influences. Enlargement will only
happen in a progressive way, which gives time to adapt decision-making
processes in the Council and in other bodies. The identity of the
Union, as Jhrgan Habermas argues - and Fischer
also agrees - should be developed around civic values, not around
attempts to find a common heritage. It makes sense, as Fischer
suggests, to think of a second chamber for the European Parliament,
but this has no necessary connection to federalism. Such a chamber
could allow national parliaments greater involvement in EU policy
formulation. However, for reasons already given, the European Parliament
will contribute more to horizontal than to vertical democracy.
In its relations with
its member nations, the Union is (should be) concerned neither merely
to defend the nation, nor to supersede it in a federal system. Rather
the EU should contribute to the restructuring of nations,
as they become less concerned with territory and more with peaceful
collaboration. It isn't a coincidence that - again not just in
Europe but almost everywhere - nations are busy rethinking their
identities and reinterpreting their past. The reason is that the
factors which shaped nations in earlier periods, including the bipolar
world, have become altered or transformed with the intensifying
of globalisation. Most found their identities in opposition to
others. 'Nations without enemies' must necessarily be different
from those of the past they can't define themselves through hostility
to 'the other'.
With intensifying globalisation, nations have
to face problems, and embrace opportunities, that demand collaborative
action. The EU can help supply the goods without which a self-governing
society is difficult or impossible to sustain in the global era.
Moving towards a federal model would exacerbate the problems of
political legitimacy which most nations now face - manifest in voter
apathy, volatility of political support and the declining influence
of parliaments. The democratic deficit of the EU cannot be addressed
by further draining the democratic capacities of member countries
through channelling more power to the EU level. We should tackle
the issue by recognising that (a) the means of reducing the democratic
failings of the EU and its constituent nations are directly parallel
and (b) mechanisms of democracy appropriate at the national level
can be no more than partially relevant at a supranational one.
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